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COMMENTS
Antitrust Law-Sherman Act, Section 2-A Monopolist
Has No Duty to Predisclose Information on Innovations
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. *
I. Introduction
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for an enterprise "to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce. . .. "I The Act fails,
however, to define the term "monopolize." Similarly, legislative history pro-
vides little assistance in determining the scope of the offense. 2 Although the
courts have made significant strides in determining standards and defining the
elements of the antitrust offenses, many important issues remain unresolved.
One of these issues is the question of what type of behavior undertaken by a
lawfully obtained monopolist will constitute a violation of section 2. The lack of
a definitive answer is illustrated by the differences between the opinions of the
District Court for the Southern District of New York3 and the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit 4 in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.
In Berkey, the courts addressed two major issues. First, the courts looked at
whether a film and camera monopolist's introduction of a camera system
without predisclosure to its competitors could constitute a violation of section 2.
In dealing with this issue, the courts had to consider whether a duty of
predisclosure could be imposed upon the monopolist and whether the introduc-
tion of an innovation (the 110 camera) and new type of complementary product
(Kodacolor II film), available only for use with the innovation, could be found
unlawful. Second, the courts faced the issue of whether a division with
monopoly power in one market (the camera market) may be forbidden under
section 2 to disclose technical information to another division in a related
market (the photofinishing market) without making the information available
to the latter's competitors. The courts arrived at different answers to these
issues.
The district court had responded affirmatively to each of these questions
• 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-427).
1 The full text of section 2 of the Sherman Act is as follows:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other per-
son, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
Private parties are permitted to bring a civil suit against violators of the Sherman Act under section 4 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
2 The major item drawn from legislative history is a statement by sponsors of the Sherman Act to the
effect that the Act would not pertain to those "who merely by superior skill and intelligence .. .got the
whole business because nobody could do it as well." 21 CONG. REC. 3146-52 (1890) quoted in United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
See generaly 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 106 (1978).
3 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
4 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-427).
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holdihg that introduction of the products as a system and failure to predisclose
could be found exclusionary and thus violations of the Act. Finding the failure
to disclose information to competing photofinishers exclusionary as well, the
district court entered an equitable decree requiring Kodak to disclose relevant
information to all photofinishers if it discloses the information to its own
photofinishing division.
The appellate court found the behavior to be a normal and lawful part of
competition and integration. The appellate court, therefore, held that the
monopolist had no duty to predisclose information on its innovation to camera
competitors and that the introduction of the film and camera as a system was
not a basis for liability under section 2. The court also vacated the equitable
decree requiring disclosure to photofinishing competitors since it found that the
decree was unfair to the monopolist who was then denied "the legitimate
benefits of integration.' '5
The courts' opinions in Berkey merit analysis as they illustrate the uncer-
tainties and inconsistencies underlying the application of section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. The present law lacks workable, definitive criteria to determine when
a monopolist's acts are unlawful. This gap is due partially to the failure of the
courts to agree on the economic and social policies underlying these criteria.
The heart of the problem lies in the paradoxical relationship between competi-
tion and monopoly-competition may give birth to its own antithesis, monopo-
ly, since competitive actions may result in the preclusion or destruction of com-
petitors.
It is necessary for the courts to examine the criteria in relation to the
underlying economic and social policies and to develop uniform standards for
determining when a lawfully obtained monopolist's acts are unlawful. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit moved in this direction by adopting a
balancing approach. Under this approach, the court balanced both the need to
protect competitors from unfair uses of monopoly power by the monopolist and
also the lawfully obtained monopolist's rights to compete, to benefit from the
lead time resulting from innovation, and to cultivate the legitimate benefits of
integration.
II. Statement of the Facts
With annual revenues in the billions of dollars, Kodak is the dominant
firm in the amateur photography industry. From 1954 through 1973 Kodak
never had less than an 88 percent share of the film market nor less than a 64
percent share of the amateur still camera market, in terms of total dollar
revenues. Kodak also offered photofinishing services and produced
photofinishing equipment, chemicals and color print paper, although its
market shares in these areas were much smaller.
As a function of its dominance, Kodak's introduction of new products has
a substantial impact on the photography markets. In 1972, when Kodak in-
troduced its 110 pocket instamatic camera, the effect on the market was signifi-
5 Id. at 292.
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cant. The camera was the first of its size in the amateur photography market
and an immediate success. Although Kodak could have manufactured one of
its earlier films in a size compatible with the 110 camera, a decision was made
to introduce a new film, Kodacolor II. The film was produced initially only in
the 110 size and required a new photofinishing process. Together, the camera
and film were introduced and advertised as a single "photographic system."
6
In the past, Kodak had elected to advance information to its competitors
on certain forthcoming innovations. Thus, the competitors had an opportunity
to develop complementary products or their own similar products for introduc-
tion simultaneous to Kodak's introduction of the innovation. With respect to
the 110 system, however, Kodak made a managerial decision to limit
predisclosure of information.7 The primary reason for this decision was ap-
parently to give Kodak a short-term monopoly on all the goods and services
relating to the system. The anticipated temporary monopoly resulted. Due to
the time necessary to develop similar products and to get them to the market,
none of Kodak's competitors were able to begin selling their own 110 pocket
cameras until nine months after Kodak's introduction of its model. Similarly,
for several weeks after the product's introduction, only Kodak's Color Print
and Processing Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as CP&P) had the technical
information and equipment necessary to photofinish the new Kodacolor II
film.
One of the competitors whose market share suffered during the short-term
monopoly was Berkey Photo, Inc., a major photofinisher that had also com-
peted in the camera market in 1972.8 Berkey believed that Kodak's introduc-
tion of the 110 system without adequate predisclosure to its camera and
photofinishing competitors violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. If Kodak had
predisclosed information on the 110 system earlier Berkey contended that it
would have been able to enter the 110 market at the same time as Kodak and
lure away some of the sales. Berkey reasoned that this alleged violation by
Kodak had caused it to lose sales in the 110 camera and photofinishing
markets. Based on this reasoning, Berkey filed an antitrust complaint in federal
district court requesting money damages.
The major allegation in Berkey's complaint was that Kodak had violated
section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the camera market. Berkey
based this allegation on three separate acts engaged in by Kodak. First, it was
contended that Kodak had monopolized the market by failing to predisclose in-
formation on its innovations. Though an innovator ordinarily has no duty to
predisclose, Berkey argued that such a duty should be imposed on Kodak.
Berkey asserted that in light of Kodak's position as an industry leader, smaller
companies could not compete effectively unless they were able to introduce
6 Id. at 276-78.
7 Fearing legal action from competitors, Kodak did predisclose some information to camera manufac-
turers for a fee. This predisclosure, however, was not made until a short time before Kodak's introduction.
Due to the inadequate time period between the predisclosure and Kodak's introduction of the camera, com-
petitors were unable to produce their own models for simultaneous introduction.
8 Through its Keystone Division operations, Berkey participated in the amateur still camera market




simultaneously models similar to Kodak's. Because a major goal underlying
antitrust law is to preserve competition, Berkey contended that predisclosure
should be required in this case as it was necessary to accomplish the goal. Also,
Berkey alleged that Kodak had forfeited its right to surprise innovation because
Kodak had previously used its film monopoly to deprive other camera
manufacturers of the right to innovate. This contention was founded on
Berkey's accusation that Kodak continually refused to make film in any size or
cartridge format other than that necessary for one of its own cameras. Berkey
reasoned that this effectively prevented Kodak's camera competitors from in-
novating major changes as they would be unable to obtain film in a new for-
mat. Berkey concluded that the competitors were forced to rely on imitating
Kodak's products, thus necessitating a duty of predisclosure.
The second action allegedly constituting monopolization was Kodak's in-
troduction of the camera and film as a system. Berkey asserted that the joint in-
troduction was an unfair use of Kodak's film monopoly. Other camera com-
petitors, lacking film-making capacity, could not introduce complete systems
and therefore were placed at a disadvantage. To support its contention that the
introduction of the system was merely an unfair ploy to gain a larger portion of
the camera market, Berkey introduced evidence that the system was, in some
ways, inferior to products already marketed.
The third and final act which Berkey characterized as supporting its
charges that Kodak had monopolized the camera market, was Kodak's initial
restriction of the new Kodacolor II film to the 110 size. Since the other com-
panies did not have a chance to introduce 110 cameras during the initial
period, Berkey argued that this restriction constituted monopolization as
anyone who wished to use the new film also had to buy a Kodak camera.
The second major allegation in Berkey's complaint was that Kodak had
unlawfully used its monopoly power in the film market to gain a competitive
edge in the photofinishing market. Essentially, Berkey objected to Kodak's film
division communicating the technical information for processing the new
Kodacolor II film to Kodak's own CP&P division without simultaneously mak-
ing the same information available to independent photofinishers. Due to the
advance receipt of information, CP&P was the beneficiary of a short-term
monopoly over 110 photofinishing services. Although CP&P was prepared to
process the Kodacolor II film immediately after its introduction, other
photofinishers such as Berkey were not able to make the necessary processing
adjustments for several weeks because of the late receipt of the information.
After a nine-month trial, a jury returned general verdicts against Kodak
on the section 2 violations discussed above and on several other antitrust
claims.9 The jury awarded Berkey total damages in excess of $87 million after
trebling. In a memorandum opinion on various posttrial motions, the district
9 In addition to the claims discussed in this comment, Berkey had requested damages for the following
alleged section 2 violations: 1) unlawful use of its film monopoly power to gain an advantage in the
photofinishing services and equipment market; 2) monopolization of the film market; and 3) monopoliza-
tion of the color print market.
Berkey also alleged that Kodak had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with General
Electric Company and Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. to restrain trade with respect to the Magicube and
Flipflash devices. For a summary of the district and appellate court dispositions of these claims, see 603 F.2d
at 309-10.
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judge upheld the jury's findings against Kodak, stating his belief that in view of
the evidence and the law, the jury had made the correct decision. He also
entered an equitable decree requiring Kodak's film division to disclose
simultaneously to the independent photofinishers all relevant information
which it communicates to its CP&P department.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit strongly disagreed
with district court, affirming only $990,000 of the damages. Although the ap-
pellate court remanded large portions of the award for a new trial, it reversed
the verdict on monopolizing the camera market without remand; the damages
awarded for this violation were over 45 million dollars. The appellate court also
vacated the equitable decree requiring simultaneous disclosure of information.
With respect to those claims remanded for a new trial, the appellate court laid
down much stricter criteria than had been applied by the district court. Berkey
Photo subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The Court denied review. 10
III. Statement of the Law: The Section 2 Offense
Berkey's complaint alleged that Kodak was liable for damages resulting
from acts of monopolizatioh and unlawful use of monopoly power in one
market to gain an advantage in another market. To establish monopolization,
monopoly power and the act of achieving or maintaining power in the same
market must be proven.1 1 The elements of the offense of unlawful use of
monopoly power are the same as those for monopolization except that the
behavior involves the use of monopoly power to achieve an advantage in a
market other than the one in which it holds monopoly power. 12 In private an-
titrust suits, it is also necessary for the plaintiff to prove he was injured by the
violation. 13
Given the statistics on Kodak's market share and apparent dominance in
the film and camera industry, both the district and appellate court agreed that
the finding of monopoly power in the camera and film markets was supported
by sufficient evidence. The major issue then was whether Kodak's acts con-
stituted a section 2 violation. Underlying this issue was the fundamental ques-
tion of the criteria to be applied in determining whether the activity undertaken
by a lawfully obtained monopolist 4 is unlawful.
10 48 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-427).
11 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see, California Computer Prod., Inc.
v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., No. 77-1563, slip op. at 2181 (9th Cir. June 21, 1979); Greyhound Com-
puter Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040
(1978).
12 Kodak did question whether unlawful use of monopoly power in another market was a section 2 of-
fense as the statute only states that monopolizing and attempting to monopolize are illegal. See note I supra.
Both the district and appellate courts, however, agreed that section 2 incorporated unlawful use of monopo-
ly power in markets other than that in which the enterprise has monopoly power. The appellate court de-
scribed the offense as requiring the elements of monopoly power and anticompetitive behavior. 603 F.2d at
271-76. A discussion on the merits of Kodak's argument that this is not a section 2 offense is outside the
scope of this comment. For a discussion on the precedents on this issue, see 603 F.2d at 275-76.
13 California Computer Prod., Inc. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., No. 77-1563, slip op. at 2181 (9th
Cir. June 21, 1979).
14 A monopolist may violate section 2 either by obtaining its monopoly power through illegitimate con-
duct or by using its lawfully obtained monopoly power unlawfully. 603 F.2d at 275. A lawfully obtained
monopolist is one which obtained its monopoly power through lawful means. In Berkey, it was not alleged




It is firmly established in case law that the existence of monopoly power
alone is not sufficient for a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act; an addi-
tional "conduct" element is necessary.15 Acts in violation of the other antitrust
laws such as section 1 of the Sherman Act16 clearly can constitute the behavior
necessary for a section 2 offense.1 7 The problem arises, however, when the con-
duct is normally lawful, but due to the nature of the market structure, it is
found particularly injurious to competition or competitors. The courts univer-
sally agree that some acts by a monopolist violate section 2 even though they
would be lawful if done by a nonmonopolistic enterprise. 8 They have failed,
however, to agree on the criteria for determining when otherwise lawful activi-
ty should be unlawful if undertaken by a monopolist.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue presented in
Berkey. Its most definitive statement on the behavioral element of the section 2
offense is found in Grinnell v. United States. 19 In Grinnell, the Court defined the
conduct requirement as "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 20 It was
unnecessary, however, for the Court to discuss further the conduct element
because the behavior by the defendant and its subsidiaries was found to be in
violation of section 1. Thus, the actions adequately met the behavioral element
required for a violation of section 2.21
The courts have developed essentially three different approaches for deter-
mining whether a monopolist's conduct violates section 2 of the Sherman
Act.22 The approaches do not directly conflict and even adopt the same basic
premises. Subtle differences of emphasis and perspective, however, change the
manner in which the issue is stated, and can lead to differing evaluations of a
monopolist's behavior.
A. The "Exceptions" Test
The first approach was developed by Judge Learned Hand of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.23 Under
this approach, although it is conceded that the existence of monopoly power
does not necessarily imply that monopolization has occurred, the stress is
placed on the evils of monopolistic structures. Rather than asking when the
monopolist's behavior is unlawful, the inquiry is made as to under what special
15 "[T]he law does not make mere size an offence or the existence of unexerted power an offence. It...
requires overt acts and trusts to its prohibition of them and its power to repress or punish them." United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
16 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that: "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
17 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911).
18 See, e.g., Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); 559 F.2d at 498.
19 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
20 Id. at 570-71.
21 Grinnell's acts included the use of restrictive agreements, anticompetitive pricing practices and ac-
quisitions of competitors. Id. at 576.
22 For a different classification of the approaches adopted by the courts, see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 33-38 (1977).
23 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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circumstances a monopolist may avoid violating section 2. Under this ap-
proach, a monopolist violates the Sherman Act unless "it falls within the excep-
tion established in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid, the control
of a market.' '24 If the monopolist was a mere "passive beneficiary"
25 of
monopoly power that had been "thrust upon ' 26 it through the "involuntary
elimination of competitors by automatically operative economic forces,''27 it
would not be in violation of section 2. If it were not "inevitable" ' 28 that the
enterprise would become and remain a monopolist but, instead, the enterprise
had actively sought to achieve or maintain its monopoly power, it would be
found in violation of the Act.
In Alcoa, Hand held that the Aluminum Company had violated section 2
by anticipating and expanding to meet increased demand for aluminum
ingots. 29 He found that Alcoa did not fall within the exception. It was not a
"passive beneficiary' '30 because it had actively sought to maintain its market
through expansion.
B. The "Exclusionary Conduct" Approach
In Alcoa, Hand had further supported his decision by finding that the
Aluminum Company's conduct was exclusionary. Alluding to Alcoa's growth
to meet demand, Hand had stated that there is "no more effective exclusion [of
competitors] than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened,
and to face every newcomer with new capacity .... -"3 Focusing upon this
secondary inquiry in Alcoa, an approach different from the exceptions test was
developed in Judge Wyzanski's opinion in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.
32
In United Shoe, Judge Wyzanski gave recognition to the exceptions ap-
proach and utilized many of the same phrases as Hand. However, a subtle dif-
ference in the tone of the opinion was manifested. Less antagonism was ex-
hibited towards monopolists. The question of what type of behavior under-
taken by a monopolist should be considered unlawful was directly addressed
with the answer being that exclusionary conduct violated section 2.
In United Shoe, the issue presented was whether it was unlawful for the
monopolist, United Shoe Machinery, to adopt a particular type of lease-only
policy. Ordinarily this type of leasing policy would not be unlawful. In view of
United Shoe's dominance in the industry and certain exclusionary features of
24 Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 430.
26 Id. at 429.
27 Id. at 430.
28 Id. at 431.
29 In addition to the expansion, Alcoa had been involved in many other activities which were alleged to
be violations of section 2. These other activities, however, did not form the basis for the decision. Some of
the activities were not considered as they had been the basis of litigation in 1912 which had resulted in a con-
sent decree. With respect to the other, post-1912, alleged unlawful activities, Hand expressly stated that
consideration of them was not necessary to the finding that Alcoa had monopolized the ingot market. Id. at
432.
30 148 F.2d at 430.
31 Id. at 431.
32 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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its lease-only policy, 33 Wyzanski found that the leasing system was in violation
of section 2. His analysis went beyond the questions of whether United Shoe
was more than a "passive beneficiary" or whether its acts were economically
"inevitable. " 34 Instead, he looked at the nature of the leasing practices and
stated:
They represent something more than the use of accessible resources, the pro-
cess of invention and innovation, and the employment of those techniques of
employment, financing, production, and distribution, which a competitive
system must foster. They are contracts, arrangements, and policies which, in-
stead of encouraging competition based on pure merit, further the dominance
of a particular firm.
35
He stressed the fact that the practices were "unnatural barriers"36 which "un-
necessarily exclude[d] actual and potential competition. '37 Contrary to
Hand's analysis, the emphasis was not placed upon the evils of a monopolistic
structure and a search for a reason to avoid condemnation, but rather focused
on the nature of the behavior undertaken and the effect of that behavior in rela-
tion to the competitive process. The question raised was whether the behavior
"excluded," and thus injured, competition and competitors.3 8
C. The Modern Approach
A third approach has developed in a recent series of cases involving IBM.
In these modern cases, the courts appear to adopt the position that although
lawfully obtained monopolists are not favored by the law, they are lawful and
cannot be found in violation of section 2 unless they undertake some kind of an-
ticompetitive conduct. Rather than focusing on the evils of the monopolistic
structure or the question of whether the act of the monopolist injures competi-
tion and competitors, the first question under this approach is whether the
monopolist's act is actually a legitimate part of competition. If the act is found
to be a legitimate part of the competitive process, then it cannot be construed as
behavior violating section 2.
The third approach was introduced by the Tenth Circuit in Telex Corp. v.
International Business Machines Corp.3 9 In Telex, the appellate court reversed a
trial court's findings that design changes in equipment and price reductions
were violations of section 2. The appellate court rejected the trial court's inter-
pretation of the law that, to avoid violation of section 2, IBM's acts had to be
within the "exception" of "development as a consequence of a superior prod-
uct, business acumen or historic accident" as described in Grinnell. 40 Instead,
33 Those features which the court considered exclusionary included the long duration of the leases (10
years), the provision for a penalty fee if, prior to the lease expiration, the leased machine was replaced by a
machine made by a competitor, and the inclusion of repair services under the lease fees.
34 See notes 25 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
35 110 F. Supp. at 344-45.
36 Id. at 345.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 343.
39 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
40 Id. at 925. The court also based the reversal on the grounds that an erroneous market definition had
been used. Id. at 933.
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the appellate court asked whether IBM's acts were "ordinary business prac-
tices typical of those used in a competitive market" 4 1 as opposed to an unfair
"use of monopoly power." 42 This language suggests that the behavior which
violates the Act must be of a type which would not be undertaken unless the
enterprise had monopoly power or which creates damages of a special kind as
opposed to injuries indigenous to a pure competitive process.
In two other cases involving IBM, this same approach was adopted by
courts in the Ninth Circuit. In Greyhound Computer Corp., Inc. v. International
Business Machines Corp., 43 Greyhound alleged that IBM had violated section 2
by implementing certain changes in its leasing and pricing policies and
manipulating discounts, rental prices, and purchase prices. All of these ac-
tivities were allegedly undertaken to injure competitors who were lessors of
computers. The appellate court reversed a directed verdict entered in IBM's
favor, holding that sufficient evidence was presented from which a jury could
have found that IBM had violated section 2. The court adopted the following
standards: (1) acts which "unnecessarily excluded competition ' 44 or which
could be classified as "anticompetitive activities that impaired competition
without a legitimate business purpose" 45 are violative behavior, whereas, (2) a
"reasonable response to . . . competition ' 4 6 is perfectly lawful. Similarly, in
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 47 the District
Court for the Northern District of California asked whether IBM's activities in
introducing a leasing policy and several new products, in initiating price cuts,
and in failing to predisclose information necessary for designing complemen-
tary products (peripheral units), were "reasonable response[s] to
competition.' '48 The court found not only that these acts were reasonable
responses but also that the introduction of the new products, although having a
"detrimental impact" 49 on smaller competitors, was precisely the type of
behavior that "the antitrust laws were meant to encourage."5 0 Based on this
determination the court entered a directed verdict in favor of IBM. 51 The em-
phasis in the IBM cases was thus placed upon whether the acts engaged in by
the monopolist were a part of the competitive process or whether they were
without a legitimate economic purpose and injurious to competitors.
IV. District Court Application of the Law
In Berkey, the district court essentially adopted the exclusionary conduct
approach. In accord with this approach, the emphasis was placed upon the im-
pact of the monopolist's acts on competition and competitors. Although the
court did caution the jury that activity which directly benefited consumers
41 Id. at 925-26.
42 Id. at 926.
43 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977).
44 Id. at 498.
45 Id. at 505.
46 Id. at 499.
47 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
48 Id. at 441-42.
49 Id. at 443.




though incidentally injuring competitors was lawful, it broadly defined the
unlawful conduct as acts "which instead of encouraging competition, were
designed primarily to further.., domination of the market.' '52 The basic ques-
tion presented to the jury was whether Kodak had "engaged in exclusionary
conduct" by introducing the film and camera as a system5 3 and by failing to
predisclose information on the innovations to camera and photofinishing com-
petitors.
5 4
In a decision on posttrial motions, the district court held that its instruc-
tions had properly interpreted the law and that the evidence supported the
jury's determination. The district court judge, Judge Marvin Frankel, found
that the evidence clearly supported the jury's determination that the introduc-
tion of the products as a system was unlawful. He reasoned that this introduc-
tion as a system, wherein the Kodacolor II film was available only for use with
the 110 camera, left "competitors paralyzed and consumers deprived of
choice" 55 because, at the time of introduction, "no other camera manufacturer
[was] in a position to offer the consumer a camera other than Kodak's for use
with that film." '56 Thus, he found that the system's introduction could con-
stitute exclusionary conduct.
Similarly, he reviewed the overall circumstances of the case and reasoned
that introduction of the innovations without predisclosure denied the com-
petitors the opportunity to "enter the market at about the same time as, and
compete on the merits with, Kodak's initial line of 110 cameras." ' 57 He con-
cluded, therefore, that the jury could have found the behavior to be exclu-
sionary and in violation of section 2. Though the judge conceded that ordinari-
ly there is no duty of predisclosure, he reasoned that, "Kodak's monopoly
power in film, if it was found to disable competitors who could not offer
cameras comparable to Kodak's, might lead judges of facts to decide that the
failure to give camera makers the necessary predisclosure concerning film
should in all the circumstances be deemed anticompetitive." 5 ,8 In reviewing
"all the circumstances, ' 59 the judge referred to evidence supporting Berkey's
various contentions that the 110 system had been introduced with the intent to
displace competitors' markets, that the new film was introduced as a com-
petitive ploy and not because it was an improvement, that the new products
were actually inferior to the products already on the market, and that Kodak
had restricted the new film to the 110 size to gain further advantage in selling
the new camera.
60
Frankel's adoption of the exclusionary conduct standard also led to the
granting of equitable relief. Reasoning that communications from Kodak's
film division to its own CP&P but not to CP&P's competitors "handicap[ped]
competitors and discourage[d] competition,' '61 the court decided that judicial
52 457 F. Supp. at 412-13 n.6.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 414 n.9.
55 Id. at 413.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 410.
58 Id. at 414.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 415.
61 Id. at 429.
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relief was necessary to prevent this exclusionary practice. The court concluded
that an equitable decree forcing "Kodak to treat all photofinishers, including
CP&P, alike in relevant respects ' 62 was the appropriate remedy as the decree
would "leave to Kodak power to disclose or not, but deprive it of the power to
confer unfair and anticompetitive advantages upon CP&P."
63
In response to Kodak's arguments that its behavior was, in fact, a normal
part of business, the district court stated that "Kodak . . . overlook[ed] that
monopolies are not darlings of the antitrust laws" 64 and that "the principles of
the Sherman Act and the pertinent precedents [demand] a frequently subtle,
inevitably comprehensive appraisal of actions by a company like
Kodak .... ",65 Simply because the behavior resulted from a business decision
it could not be "shielded from scrutiny." 66 Kodak's arguments that its acts
were competitive and economically reasonable were to no avail as the court
answered that "the antitrust laws do not permit willful maintenance of
monopoly power by conduct that might for a company without such power be
deemed 'honestly industrial.' "67
Judge Frankel also noted that had Kodak's behavior been judged under
Alcoa's "exceptions" approach, it would have equally been found to have
violated section 2. Kodak had actively obtained the temporary monopoly by in-
troducing the new system and not predisclosing information about it; the tem-
porary monopoly had not been "thrust upon ' 68 it and certainly was not "in-
evitable." ' 69 The district court characterized Kodak's acts as "plainly
avoidable" 70 and, therefore, likewise in violation of section 2 under the stricter
Alcoa criteria.
V. Appellate Court Analysis
On appeal, the Second Circuit did not adopt the "exclusionary" conduct
standard as the district court had; instead, it used an approach similar to the
one developed in the IBM cases. In analyzing the conduct element of the sec-
tion 2 offense, the court stressed the principles that monopoly power alone is
not unlawful and that an enterprise which lawfully obtains monopoly power
should not be penalized for successfully competing. Based upon these
premises, the court determined that a lawfully obtained monopolist does not
violate the Act merely by capitalizing upon advantages inherent to its success,
such as size and integration. The conduct it found to be proscribed by the
statute was the attainment of monopoly power through unlawful means or the
use of the monopolist's market power to "prevent or impede competition."
' 71
Based on this reasoning the Second Circuit did not inquire whether the
monopolist's activity was "exclusionary," as the district court had, but instead
62 Id. at 430.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 414.
65 Id. at 415.
66 Id.




71 603 F.2d at 274.
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made a two-part inquiry. The appellate court interpreted the law as requiring
it to ask whether the monopolist's acts were anticompetitive exercises of its
monopoly power or whether, instead, the acts were legitimate, competitive
business activity.
Under that interpretation of the law, the court of appeals found it
necessary to reverse the verdict against Kodak. The court held that, "as a mat-
ter of law, Kodak did not have a duty to predisclose information about the 110
system to competing camera manufacturers." ' 72 The court reasoned that in-
novation is a very desirable and legitimate part of competition. It found that as
part of the competitive process, an innovator, be it a monopolist or the smallest
firm in the industry, "has a right to the lead time that follows from its
success.' ,73
The court stated that there would be no duty to predisclose even if Berkey
was correct in its contentions that (1) the smaller competitors could not com-
pete effectively unless they imitated Kodak's products, and (2) that Kodak
should be penalized for failing to meet competitors' requests for new film for-
mats to be used with their innovations. With respect to the first contention, the
court believed that imposition of a predisclosure duty would harm the com-
petitive system more than it would help. Though predisclosure would help
smaller competitors maintain their market shares, the court reasoned that it
would greatly diminish the incentive to innovate, a very important part of com-
petition. The monopolist would not expend large sums on research and
development since it would not be able to reap the benefits of innovation. If it
were forced to adhere to predisclosure, its competitors would be able to pro-
duce cheaper imitations of the innovation for introduction at the same time,
undercutting any advantage to be gained through new developments. Apply-
ing section 2 in this manner would discourage monopolists from competing,
rather than implementing the goal of encouraging competition.
In addressing the second contention, that Kodak should be penalized for
failing to provide formats necessary for competitors' innovations, the appellate
court agreed that if Kodak had "used its film monopoly to stifle format innova-
tions by any other camera manufacturer,' '74 it had probably acted unlawfully.
The court accepted "the proposition that it is improper, in the absence of a
valid business policy, for a firm with monopoly power in one market to gain a
competitive advantage in another by refusing to sell a rival the monopolized
goods or services he needs to compete effectively in the second market.' ' 75
Berkey, however, did not base its section 2 allegation on the failure to supply a
requested film format and establish injury therefrom. Berkey's argument
posited that the previous refusal to supply formats for other cameras justified
the imposition on Kodak of the duty to predisclose information on its innova-
tions. It alleged that failure to meet that duty to predisclose was the violation
from which injury arose. Although the court stated that Berkey could attempt
to establish a case based upon the refusal to supply formats and resulting in-
72 Id. at 281.
73 Id. at 283.
74 Id. at 283-84.
75 Id. at 284.
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jury, the court found no legal basis for the idea that the refusal to supply for-
mats created a duty to predisclose. Because the damages Berkey established
were based on the failure to predisclose and not the refusal to supply a film for-
mat, Berkey did not have a right to recovery.
In addition to finding that failure to predisclose did not constitute a viola-
tion of section 2, the appellate court also held that the simple introduction of
the film and camera as a system did not constitute monopolization. The court
reasoned that the ability to introduce the new film and camera was simply a
benefit of integration and research and development, and did not involve any
anticompetitive use of monopoly power. Kodak had not used its monopoly
power in the film industry to coerce consumers into purchasing the 110
camera, as it had continued to produce its other lines of film to accommodate
those consumers who elected to use one of the other cameras produced by
Kodak or its competitors.
76
The appellate court similarly found it necessary to vacate the lower court's
equitable decree requiring Kodak to treat its own CP&P division the same as
independent photofinishers with respect to disclosure of information. The court
stated that "[s]o long as we allow a firm to compete in several fields, we must
expect it to seek the competitive advantages of its broad-based activity." 77 Free
communications concerning product developments between divisions of a cor-
poration is a benefit of integration; it does not involve a use of monopoly





As the district court stated in Berkey, "the basic historical facts ... [were]
not in significant dispute." 79 The dispute between the courts arose as to the in-
terpretation of the law. Through its adoption of the exclusionary conduct ap-
proach, the district court adopted the premise that monopoly power is bad and
that the behavior of monopolists is suspect. The court applied the standard that
a monopolist's activity violates section 2 if his act or failure to act injures com-
petitors unless such activity is justified as necessary to encourage competition
or improve consumer welfare.
In contrast, the appellate court's major premise was that monopolists
which lawfully obtained their monopoly power do not violate section 2 unless
they undertake anticompetitive behavior. Under this approach, a violation
would be found only if the plaintiff established that he suffered injury resulting
from specific behavior undertaken by the monopolist and that this behavior
76 The court did not directly deal with the question of whether the restriction of the Kodacolor II film to
the 110 format, as part of the system introduction, could constitute the behavior necessary for a section 2
violation. The court found it unnecessary to answer this question as Berkey had failed to establish damages
caused by the restriction; Berkey failed to offer any evidence showing that a consumer bought a Kodak
camera, rather than a competitor's, simply because he desired to use the new film. Id. at 288-89.
77 Id. at 276.
78 Id. at 292.
79 457 F. Supp. at 410.
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was a use of monopoly power designed to injure competitors as opposed to be-
ing a normal part of the competitive process. The standard for determining a
section 2 violation under this interpretation was not whether the monopolist's
acts injured competitors, but was whether the behavior, on balance, was pro-
competitive or anticompetitive.
The law is not well-settled as to the section 2 offenses. Confusion arises
because of the lack of a definitive standard within the statute itself, and the lack
of a uniform approach or standard in the precedents. As Berkey evidences, dif-
ferent approaches adopted by the courts can lead to differing results. The case
manifests the need for a uniform approach and uniform, definitive criteria to
determine when a monopolist's behavior is unlawful.
B. The Policies
The source of confusion which has led to the development of differing ap-
proaches and tests in applying section 2 is the paradoxical nature of the goals of
the Sherman Act. Traditionally, preservation of competition and prevention of
concentration of economic power have been perceived as the major goals
underlying the antitrust laws. Preservation of competition is desirable because
it acts to maximize the benefits received by the consuming public and creates
economic efficiencies. 80 Prevention of concentration of economic power is
desired as part of the Jeffersonian democratic ideal which is symbolized by
"small, local, responsible, and individually owned enterprises [as] contrasted
with large, politically irresponsible, absentee-owned, and possibly corrupt
giants capable of crushing smaller businessmen and individuals and of sub-
verting democratic government. "81
Superficially, these goals appear to dovetail. The Jeffersonian ideal en-
visages competition among small enterprises and competition presupposes
many enterprises striving to maximize their profits through better service to
consumers. The problem is that the goals of preserving competition and
preventing concentration of economic power may often conflict in practice.
Under the competitive system, each firm attempts to maximize its profits and
to enlarge its market share through the introduction of new and better products
at lower prices. Although these efforts benefit the consumer, they may lead to
the destruction of competitors who simply cannot meet the competition because
of inefficiency, lack of innovation, or simple bad luck. Due to the efficiencies
derived from economies of scale or "superior entrepreneurial and innovative
talent," one or two businesses may win the competitive battle.8 2 In this man-
ner, the other competitors may be forced out of the market leaving economic
power concentrated in the winners. Thus competition itself may lead to
monopolies. Continued competitive actions by the monopolist, such as innova-
tions or the adoption of more efficient processes leading to lower prices and
higher quality, will serve to perpetuate the monopolist's power.
80 See generally I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 103-13; Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium
on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 1182 (1977).
81 See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 109b.
82 Id. at 103.
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The problem faced by the courts is caused by this paradoxical relationship
between competition and monopoly. Since competition is highly valued and
encouraged in American society, it is considered inequitable to punish a
lawfully obtained monopolist for succeeding in the competitive process. Based
on this policy consideration, the courts have held that the existence of monopo-
ly power alone does not violate the law.
Monopolists are disfavored by the law, however, as they are harmful to
the competitive process and opposed to the populist goals discussed above. The
courts have limited what a monopolist can do, in hopes of maintaining com-
petitive practices and protecting smaller competitors. The various approaches
developed by the courts differ in the emphasis placed on these underlying goals
and tenets.
C. Shortcomings of the District Court Approach
The district court approach places great emphasis on the attainment of an-
titrust goals by preventing injury to competitors and hence, competition, and
by placing limitations on the acts of monopolistic enterprises. In Berkey, in-
troduction of the camera and film as a system injured competitors as they
lacked the film-making capacity to introduce such systems. A duty to
predisclose information was implied as refusal to predisclose injured com-
petitors who were unable to offer similar cameras and photofinishing services
at the time of introduction.
By keying on the .question of whether competitors have been injured and
adopting a strong willingness to condemn the monopolist's acts, the approach
fails. Inadequate consideration is given to the rights and needs of the lawfully
obtained monopolist and to the desirability of competitive acts by all com-
petitors, including the monopolist. Additionally, the long-term detrimental im-
pact of the remedies is often overlooked due to the excessive preoccupation with
injury to competitors. Application of the exclusionary conduct approach tends
to place lawfully obtained monopolists in an inequitable position and does not
effectuate the goals for which it was designed. Instead, the results may actually
be counterproductive to the goals of the antitrust laws.
The monopolist is placed in an unfair position as it has a legal right to exist
but, under the district court approach, it is not permitted to exist in an
economically meaningful manner without risking violation of section 2. As a
private business entity, the monopolist's purpose is to make profits for its
shareholders. However, if the "exceptions" or "exclusionary" conduct test is
strictly applied, the mere production of a single widget by a monopolist could
be construed to be unlawful. By making and selling the widget, the monopolist
would have actively sought a part of the market and would not be a "passive
beneficiary." 83 Similarly, the act technically "excludes" smaller competitors
who could have otherwise made the sale. Thus, under these standards, the
83 See note 25 supra.
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undertaking of the most fundamental business activity by a monopolist could
be found violative of the Act.
84
Admittedly, the district court judge in Berkey probably would not have per-
mitted a jury to decide that the production and sale of a camera by Kodak was
exclusionary. In his instructions, the judge had made some attempt to
distinguish between behavior violating section 2 as it excluded competition and
behavior which was beneficial to consumers although incidentally excluding
competitors. Even this distinction, however, failed to consider the mechanism
of the competitive process and the monopolist's need to exist in an economical-
ly rational manner within that process.
This failure is illustrated by considering the behavior which the court per-
mitted the jury to find violative of the Act-introduction of the film and camera
as a system and failure to predisclose information on the innovations and on
photofinishing processes for the new film. The court had reasoned that the in-
troduction of the system was not beneficial to the consumer because, as the
court stated, he was "deprived of choice";85 if he wished to use the new film
during its initial period of availability, he had to buy the other part of the
system, the new Kodak camera. Likewise, it reasoned that failure to
predisclose was not lawful exclusion as, if Kodak would have given adequate
predisclosure, the consumers would have been given the choice of 1 10 cameras
and photofinishing services from many competitors at the time of introduction.
Condemnation of this behavior, although it met the district court criteria,
violated the principle that a lawfully obtained monopolist may lawfully exist. It
also violated the concept that a corporation may be horizontally integrated.
86
Presumably, if a monopolist, as a business entity, has a right to exist, it has a
right to attempt to earn profits through competition. Similarly, if a company
has the right to be integrated, it should have the right to use its integrative
capabilities and act as an integrated business. Under the district court decision,
though, Kodak would not be permitted to utilize its integration. It could not
have one division make a new type of complementary product designed solely
for an innovation developed by another division without fear that a jury or
judge will later decide that the introduction of the new complementary product
was unnecessary. Nor could this corporation act as a single unit. In accord with
the equitable decree, Kodak would have been required to act as if its own Color
Print and Processing organization was not part of the company. Likewise,
Kodak could not attempt to earn maximum profits by actively competing
84 As Robert Bork stated:
The problem is to know what exclusion is improper. All business activity excludes. A sale ex-
cludes rivals from that piece of business. Any firm that operates excludes rivals from some share
of the market. Superior efficiency forecloses. Indeed, exclusion or foreclosure is the mechanism
by which competition confers its benefits upon society. The more efficient exclude the less effi-
cient from the control of resources, and they do so only to the degree that their efficiency is
superior.
Such exclusion is proper and beneficial. It is the task of antitrust to see that it continues to
operate. Antitrust, therefore, must be able to distinguish efficiency exclusion from improper ex-
clusion. The conceptual apparatus now in use is incapable of making that crucial distinction.
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 137 (1978).
85 457 F. Supp. at 413.
86 This concept was implicitly accepted by the district court. If the district court did not think that it
was lawful for Kodak to be horizontally integrated, then, logically, it should have ordered divestiture. The
court, however, denied Berkey's request that divestiture be ordered. Id. at 428-29.
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through innovation. Instead, it would be required to help its competitors by
predisclosing information on innovations. Due to the predisclosure require-
ment, Kodak would not even have the right to recoup some of its research and
development costs by being first on the market with its own innovation and the
associated complementary services. The limitation on these activities was vir-
tually indistinguishable from limiting the monopolist's right to produce that
single widget. Under this approach, although the monopolist would be permit-
ted to exist, it would be questionable whether it could exist in a rational man-
ner.
Perhaps it would be acceptable to place the monopolist in this inequitable
position if the approach was effective in implementing the goals of the Sherman
Act. As is illustrated by the potential results of the lower court decision,
however, the approach is unsatisfactory in implementing the underlying
policies.
The district court approach and test placed emphasis on protecting com-
petition and competitors from injury. At first, this appears to be an appropriate
way to implement the goals of preserving competition, striving to meet the
populist ideal, and preventing concentration of economic power. Protecting
competitors is important to preserving competition because without more than
one business there is no competition. Similarly, the image of the Jeffersonian
ideal requires many competitors and the existence of competitors implies some
distribution of economic power.
Due to the paradoxical nature of competition, however, attempts to pro-
tect competitors may actually lead to the destruction, rather than the preserva-
tion, of competition. As discussed earlier, some successful competitive acts
harm competitors. If the competitors are protected from this harm by prevent-
ing the acts, then the cure is the prevention or limitation of those competitive
acts and hence, competition itself. This paradox is illustrated by the imposition
upon a monopolist of the duty to predisclose information on innovations.
Failure to predisclose hurts competitors as they cannot offer similar products at
the date of introduction. However, by requiring predisclosure and thus allow-
ing competitors to introduce imitations and complementary services at the
same time, the monopolist-innovator is deprived of one of the incentives to in-
novate-the increased profits associated with being the first on the market with
the new goods. With this incentive gone, the monopolist is less likely to expend
funds on research and development and attempt to innovate. Because innova-
tion is a very important and desirable part of competition, the net effect may be
characterized as discouraging competition by the monopolist.
In addition to discouraging competition by the monopolist, broad restric-
tions on acts of monopolists and increased liability are likely to dampen com-
petition by firms approaching the status of monopoly. Large firms that have
not yet attained sufficient power to be classified as monopolies, but that are
near to that status, will be unwilling to increase their market share. They will
not want to be exposed to the greater liability and be subjected to the associated
broad restrictions on behavior. Therefore, they may restrict their growth ef-
forts and attempt to maintain the status quo. This could lead to the evils of
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economic stagnation and sluggishness which Hand associated with monopolies
in Alcoa. 
87
Also, the requirement that monopolistic enterprises help their competitors
through predisclosure and similar rules could lead to complacency among the
medium-sized firms rather than stimulating competition. As a result of the
district court holding in Berkey, Kodak's competitors would have less desire to
expend funds on research and development of new cameras since Kodak would
be required to share its innovations with them through predisclosure. To deny
the innovator, Kodak, a portion of the initial higher profits from being the first
on the market with its innovation would be counterproductive to the preserva-
tion of competition. Even more counterproductive is the awarding of these
profits to Berkey, a substantial enterprise which complained because Kodak
did not earlier tell it how to imitate the innovation.
88
This protection of competitors, if it is extended broadly and does
discourage competition, will not effectively implement the Jeffersonian goals.
The idealistic image is one of hardworking, enterprising businesses merely ask-
ing for a chance to compete fairly. The ideal is not a picture of large corpora-
tions parasitically increasing their profits through the judicially enforced
assistance of monopolistic enterprises. By implying a duty of predisclosure,
which is essentially a duty to help competitors, the latter image is more likely to
be created than the former.
Although the motivation underlying the district court decision was
basically sound, the decision was unsatisfactory. The court, by adopting the
exclusionary conduct approach, failed to consider adequately the position and
needs of the monopolist, the paradoxical nature of the competitive process and
the long-range effects of its judgment.
D. Advantages of the Appellate Court Approach
The appellate court approach, which could be labelled the competitive-
anticompetitive balancing test, succeeds for the very reason the district court
approach fails. In addition to considering the need to protect competitors from
injury unfairly inflicted, the appellate court approach recognized the right of
the monopolist to exist, compete, and receive the benefits of its integration, in-
novative talents, and size. Given this latter consideration, the court did not
begin with an expectation that the monopolist would be found in violation
unless it could justify its acts. Instead, the court began with an awareness that
the monopolist has a right to compete and to take advantage of its integration.
The court recognized, however, that a monopolist does not have a right to use
its monopoly power to undertake behavior which lacks any legitimate business
purpose except to increase profits in the long run by destroying or foreclosing
competitors in the short run.
87 In his discourse on the evils of monopolistic structures, Hand stated: "Many people believe that
possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that
immunity from competition is narcotic,... that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an in-
evitable disposition to let well enough alone." 148 F.2d at 427.
88 See Sims, 'Kodak'Provides Comfort for Trust Defendants, Legal Times of Wash.,July 16, 1979, at 13, col.
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Through its recognition that the monopolist should be allowed to act in a
competitive manner, the competitive-anticompetitive balancing test avoids
three failings from which the district court's approach suffers. First, the balanc-
ing test gives economic reality to the legal principle that monopoly power alone
is not unlawful. The lawfully obtained monopolist is permitted to act in an
economically rational manner as, under this test, it is permitted to compete ac-
tively. The inequity of the successful competitor being penalized solely for its
success does not arise under this test. Second, the consumer is able to reap the
benefits resulting from the monopolist's continued competition. This may be
through lower prices due to efficiency and integration, innovation, or other ad-
vantages inuring to the consumer from competition. Third, inefficient com-
petitors are not protected at the expense of consumers. Under this approach,
competitors are forced to meet the competition from the monopolists and come
close to their prices and quality of product. Those producers which are ineffi-
cient or unable to offer the consumer modern, quality products are forced from
the market.
Through its recognition that monopoly power may be used in an an-
ticompetitive manner to unfairly destroy competitors and that this should be
prevented, the balancing test provides a measure of protection to smaller com-
petitors. Competitors are not protected from competitive practices which may
injure them due to their inefficiency or inability to keep up with technological
developments. Activities by the monopolist which involve manipulation of its
monopoly power to destroy competitors or limit their advances in the market
without a legitimately competitive purpose would be unlawful, however, under
this test.
This distinction is illustrated by the appellate court's decision in Berkey.
Failure to predisclose information about the innovation and complementary
services could not be found to violate section 2. The resultant lead time advan-
tage was the competitive incentive to innovate. As an integral part of competi-
tion, innovation without predisclosure was encouraged rather than forbidden.
Similarly, introduction of the camera and film as a system was merely a benefit
of integration and not a use of monopoly power. Therefore, it could not be the
basis for a violation of section 2, although firms lacking integration are placed
at a disadvantage.
Refusal by Kodak to supply film to its competitors in the camera market,
however, could be violative of section 2. If a competitor had sued because
Kodak had refused to supply it with a film in a new format necessary for the
competitor's innovation, the court indicated that it would be willing to find a
violation of section 2.
Other examples of conduct which courts would probably find unlawful
under the balancing test are predatory pricing and leasing practices such as
those in United Shoe. The selling of goods below cost would appear to be a viola-
tion of section 2 since that act would not have a legitimately competitive pur-
pose. The act would not be undertaken for direct profit-maximization but in-
stead for the expectation of future profits after the destruction of competitors
which did not have sufficient capital to absorb losses during a "price war."
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Similarly, the leasing practices in United Shoe"9 would also likely be considered
anticompetitive since the primary aim of the leases was to make it economically
impractical for manufacturers to utilize a competitor's machine. No pro-
competitive purpose was served by the leasing arrangements.
The distinction between anticompetitive and competitive behavior is very
subtle and difficult to discern. A shortcoming of the appellate court approach is
that a great deal of subjectivity remains. Objective, definitive criteria would be
preferable but it is questionable whether the formulation of totally objective
standards is feasible given the nature of antitrust regulation. The balancing test
is workable, however, since it recognizes that subjectivity is involved and
presents to the trier of fact the conflicting interests. As long as the two different
types of exclusion, competitive and anticompetitive, are recognized and the
trier of fact considers the interests of the monopolist, competitors, and the com-
petitive process, the policies underlying the antitrust laws are likely to be effec-
tuated.
VII. Conclusion
The Second Circuit's decision in Berkey is important because of its express
recognition of a lawfully obtained monopolist's right to compete, to benefit
from the lead time resulting from its innovation, and to cultivate the legitimate
benefits of integration. Through the application of a competitive-
anticompetitive balancing test, the court found that monopolists, such as
Kodak, must be allowed to compete and reap the benefits of their competitive
successes. In this manner, the lawfully obtained monopolist is permitted a ra-
tional existence. The court warned monopolists, however, that although they
may incidentally injure their competitors by winning the competitive battle
fairly, they cannot undertake activity without a legitimate business purpose
simply to destroy or impair the effectiveness of their competitors. Monopoly
power cannot be used purposefully to disable competitors. By analyzing the
facts from both the competitive and anticompetitive perspectives, the appellate
court gained a better insight into molding a solution which is in accord with the
policies underlying the Sherman Act.
May E. Anthony
89 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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